In a suit where the state defendants challenged the federal governments right to take land into trust for the Tribe, The court ruled in favor of the Tribe and United States holding: (1) 25 U.S.C.S. § 465, which authorized the land to be taken into trust, did not violate violated the non-delegation doctrine; (2) the Indian trust land exemption in the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2409a, divested the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over state defendants' challenge to the decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to take the land into trust after the fact, and the district court therefore erred in reviewing the trust acquisition and in concluding that the BIA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to conduct a pre-acquisition, and in directing a post-acquisition, environmental assessment (EA). As a result, whether the EA was conducted in good faith was deemed moot; (3) Enforcement of the Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C.S. § 131 et seq., on trust land was reserved for the federal government; and (4) Allowing the state to exercise control over the land would have threatened Congress's overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic development. The state could not exercise its police power to regulate the land at issue.
Fredericks represented the Shivwits Band.
Indian Tribe intervened in individual tribal members' suit against federal government challenging the tribal enrollment of 72 members and moved to dismiss the action. The court of appeals upheld the district court's dismissal because Tribe was an indispensable party who enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit, and because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, since any relief granted would directly implicate the Tribe's sovereign right to determine its own membership and enrollment procedures, and federal court did not have authority to determine the tribe's membership criteria
Fredericks represented the Intervening Tribe.
Suit to prevent the San Diego County Treasurer from enforcement of county hotel tax on Tribe's Hotel and casino managed by HCAL, a non Indian corporation. District court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the legal incidence of the hotel tax fell on the Tribe and not HCAL, such that the tax was barred by the per se rule against state taxation of Indian Tribes.
Fredericks represented the Tribe.
Plaintiff sued Indian Health service and Fort Peck Housing authority for wrongful death. Plaintiff appealed orders from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Ninth Circuit court of appeals held that because tribal courts had the inherent power to adjudicate civil disputes affecting the interests of Indians and non-Indians that were based upon events occurring on the reservation, the claimant was required to exhaust her tribal remedies before bringing an action in the district court. The court further held that because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, it erred in considering the motion for summary judgment.
Fredericks represented the Fort Peck Housing authority.
Suit involving a dispute between two secured lenders over priority of security interests in an equipment lease. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as successor in interest to an insolvent creditor, successfully claimed first priority under the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code before the trial court. On appeal, the Denver Tec bank contended that the trial court erred in finding that the insolvent creditor had been the first perfect its security interests in the two agreements by properly filing financing statements and that the FDIC therefore had a superior interest in the agreements. The bank argued that the insolvent creditor could not have perfected its security interests because the debtor had failed to satisfy the requirements for attachment of the insolvent creditor's security interests. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the requirements for attachment had been satisfied by the debtor under Col. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-303(1)(a) (1992) because the debtor's signature on the insolvent creditor's security agreements was all that was required for the security interest to attach and became enforceable against the debtor. The court found that the trial court properly assigned priority to the FDIC as the successor in interest pursuant to Col. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-312(5)(a) because the insolvent creditor perfected its interest by properly filing financing statements under Col. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-304(1) (1992) before the bank had perfected its interest in the collateral.
Fredericks represented the FDIC
Montana Supreme Court reversed state district court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction over out of state company in plaintiff's suit for interference with a business relationship, breach of fiduciary duty to maintain confidentiality of cost information and drawings, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The Court held that the out of state company had sufficient minimum contacts with Montana, that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend notions of fair play and justice, and did not violate due process of law.
Fredericks represented the Plaintiff.
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